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a b s t r a c t
We present a steganalytic attack against the PDF component of the popular OpenPuff tool. We show that
our ﬁndings allow us to accurately detect the presence of OpenPuff steganography over the PDF format
by using a simple script. OpenPuff is a prominent multi-format and semi-open-source stego-systemwith
a large user base. Because of its popularity, we think our results could potentially have relevant security
and privacy implications. The relative simplicity of our attack, paired with its high accuracy and the
existence of previous steganalytic ﬁndings against this software, warrants major concerns over the real
security offered by this steganography tool.
© 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Introduction
Steganography is the process of hiding information in plain
sight. This can be used to carry out secret communications or avoid
suspicion over the exchange of information. It is important to
emphasise that the objectives of steganography are very different
to those of cryptography. The latter provides conﬁdentiality but
does not disguise the existence of secret data, which is obvious to
any observer and can even be automatically detected due to the
high entropy of encrypted data. Steganography, however, aims to
avoid detection under all circumstances, even when an active
warden has full access to all exchanged data. In most cases, steg-
anographic tools and algorithms will also use cryptography to
encrypt the contents that will be later hidden, but their objectives
are more ambitious; data should be exchanged without raising any
suspicion. This ultimately aims for carrier ﬁles to be indistin-
guishable from unmodiﬁed, clean sources. Consequently, the main
objective of steganalysis, the associated discipline, is the pursuit of
identifying and proving the existence of steganography. Additional
objectives could be to estimate the size of the hidden contents, and
in a few cases fully recover the hidden message and/or key used.
The techniques used by the steganalyst will vary, depending on the
embedding algorithm that has been used, but will often be statis-
tically themed or system based.
Modern steganography is often aimed at digital media. There is
a myriad of tools able to perform steganography over different
carrier formats, such as images, audio, video, executable ﬁles,
games, VoIP, P2P, etc. Any format that contains some form of
redundancy can ultimately be employed for steganography (Provos
and Honeyman, 2003).
Relevance of modern steganography
Steganography, very much like cryptography, is a dual-use
technology. On the one side, it can be used to evade censorship in
circumstances where free speech or the free ﬂow of information is
limited or restricted. Another use of steganography is to evade the
increasingly prying eyes of snooping governments across the
world, that try to ban or limit encryption with the excuse that
terrorist and other criminals also use it. On the other side, this is
partly true as steganography can also help cyber-criminals and
terrorists to conceal their communications while exchanging
important information and evading prosecution. Steganography is
then both a very useful and necessary tool for providing the general
public with increased privacy and anonymity, but also can poten-
tially help a very small minority of its users to avoid detectionwhile
planning or committing malicious activities. It should be emphas-
ised that steganography tools and its community of users will often
have legitimate reasons (i.e. journalists, civil rights and democracy
activists under threat of imprisonment, etc.) to use steganography
as a means to communicate safely (The Guardian Project, 2017).
However, it is unfortunately the criminal use of steganography
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which more often reaches widespread exposure through the me-
dia. Recent cases in point are the use of image steganography by a
network of Russian spies in the US (Shachtman, 2010), video
steganography usage by an Al-Qaeda operative in Germany
(Gallagher, 2012), or recent strands of malware employing steg-
anography for communication with their command and control
servers (Young, 2015).
In recent years, video steganography has become an increas-
ingly popular technique for data exﬁltration. One example is the
case of an undisclosed Fortune 500 company that was hit by this
type of attack (Paganini, 2017). The use of video steganography
allowed for large amounts of sensitive data to be exﬁltrated from
the company network after the breach, bypassing all the data
leakage protection (DLP) tools and intrusion detection systems
(IDS) put in place.
Paper organisation
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: We will ﬁrst
introduce the OpenPuff steganography tool, covering some of its
features, and discussing its popularity and known previous attacks.
We will then focus on its operation over PDF ﬁles. Afterwards, we
will show how to construct and test an efﬁcient distinguisher
capable of detecting its carrier ﬁles with high accuracy. Also, we
will explore how to estimate the size of the hidden data. We will
then provide additional results and insights, obtained after exten-
sively testing our proposed approach. We continue with a discus-
sion of our ﬁndings, elaborating on their potential impact. Finally,
we close the paper with some comments on the social and moral
implications of this research, together with conclusions and ideas
for future related works.
OpenPuff
OpenPuff is a tool capable of performing steganography over a
large number of different ﬁle formats, concretely (as listed on the
tool's website) sixteen, covering media such as images (bmp, jpx,
pcx, png, and tga formats), audio (aiff, mp3, NEXT/SUN, wav), video
(3gp, mp4 mpg, wob) and Flash/Adobe formats (ﬂv, swf, and pdf).
The present study is focused on its operation over the PDF format.
OpenPuff description
OpenPuff (currently in version 4.0) is marketed as ”Yet not
another Steganography Software” and is a free semi-open-source
tool, which uses the libObfuscate v.2 library, developed by the
same author, to perform its cryptography related tasks. The
libObfuscate library implements a number of encryption algo-
rithms (including AES, Anubis, Camellia, CAST-256, Cleﬁa, Frog,
Hierocrypt3, Idea-NXT, MARS, RC6, Saferþ, SC200, Serpent, Speed,
Twoﬁsh, and Unicorn-A). This large selection of sixteen block ci-
phers is employed to realise the concept of multi-cryptography,
ﬁrst introduced by its author, where the cipher used to encrypt
data is picked pseudo-randomly. It is important to note that, as
shown in the architectural design in Fig. 1, these block ciphers are
used in the insecure ECB mode, strongly against common practice.
It may well be pertinent to add that most of these block ciphers are
considered to be very weak or, in some cases, totally broken. Most
are not currently in use, and did not even make it to the ﬁnal stages
of the AES competition in 2001.
These design choices are highly non-standard, and some are
plainly wrong from a security point of view. We will discuss
these issues further in the Conclusions section. libObfuscate
also implements four hash functions, all producing a 512-bit
digest. These are Grostl, Keccak (the new SHA-3 standard),
SHA-2 and Skein. OpenPuff also offers a cryptographically
secure pseudo-random number generator (CSPRNG) based on
AES but not following any known PRNG standard. It is perhaps
relevant to stress that, although libObfuscate's source code is
available, OpenPuff is in itself closed source, so we don't know
exactly how the steganography algorithms operate. This is
again against best practice and can be considered a security
issue.
OpenPuff popularity
Despite its highly unusual and sometimes very questionable
design criteria, OpenPuff has received notoriously positive feedback
and enjoys a very good reputation. Users appear to appreciate its
versatility, simplicity, and ability to perform over multiple media. It
is quite common to ﬁnd recommendations and positive reviews for
OpenPuff (Zukerman, 2013), which has been short-listed in a
number of ”Best security tools” or ”Best steganography tools” ar-
ticles, some recently and by prestigious media and cyber-security
experts (Hosmer, 2012). Although details are not available on the
tool's website, third party sites reveal large download numbers
(these ﬁgures are as of 27/09/2017), as shown in Table 1. We expect
the total numbers of downloads to be signiﬁcantly higher than
those shown below.
Related work
Known steganalytic results against OpenPuff are surprisingly
scarce. To the best of our knowledge, much of the related work
in this avenue of steganography has been reported in just two
academic publications: A recent attack targets the MP4 compo-
nent (Sloan and Hernandez-Castro, 2015). This work takes
advantage of OpenPuff's modiﬁcation of MP4 ﬂags that are
commonly set to a null value. Based on this observation, a script
is proposed which, after being extensively tested, demonstrates
high detection accuracy. As a result, the MP4 component of
OpenPuff should be considered broken and hence totally inse-
cure. The audio component of OpenPuff was examined by Liu
et al. (2011) who were able to successfully detect OpenPuff
steganography as implemented on an older version of the tool
(v3.10). The authors proposed the StegAD scheme to detect audio
steganography in cloud services, using an enhanced version of
the RS algorithm originally proposed by Fridrich et al (Fridrich
and Goljan, 2002).
The use of PDF steganography has been explored both inside
and outside academic literature. Several embedding algorithms
have been proposed by researchers, while a number of tools also
exist for public and commercial use. In current literature, algo-
rithms can either target the PDF format directly, or exploit a form of
ASCII steganography, which can then be converted from one text-
type format to another. Rafat & Sher (Rafat and Sher, 2013) pro-
pose an ASCII based steganographic algorithm robust enough to
allow conversion between MS Word and PDF ﬁles without losing
any of the embedded content.
Alizadeh et al. (Alizadeh-Fahimeh et al., 2012) examine a num-
ber of existing techniques for PDF steganography including word/
character embedding and themanipulation of incremental updates.
However, these are not robust techniques and cannot be used
outside of the PDF environment. The authors also examine similar
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but more efﬁcient embedding algorithms such as steganography
via hidden PDF components and the manipulation of margins and
TJ operators. The authors continue the work of Zhong et al. (2007)
and develop two similar algorithms, one with slightly better se-
curity but lower capacity, the other with higher capacity but
provably worse security.
Furthermore, tools such as StegoStick, DeEgger Embedder,
wbStego are examples of the many available to the general public
that can perform steganography over PDF ﬁles.
On the other hand, there is only a handful of published
steganalytic attacks against PDF in the existing literature. One
such example is a detection method for word shift steganography
in PDF, by Lingjun et al. (2008). The authors propose a blind
steganalytic attack against steganography through inter-word
space length, through the analysis of the statistical properties
of spacing.
OpenPuff PDF steganography
In this section, we present our ﬁndings on the operation of
OpenPuff over PDF carrier ﬁles. For context, we will also include a
very brief introduction to the PDF format, highlighting just the
basic knowledge required to understand the attack discussed. We
will also detail very brieﬂy the state-of-the-art, to put OpenPuff's
algorithm into perspective.
The PDF format
The contents of this section are largely based on (Incorporated,
2006; King, 2005) to which we refer any interested readers for
further technical info.
The Portable Document Format, known widely as PDF, is a
document format published originally by Adobe as a proprietary
model in 1993. It was not until 2008 that it was published as an
open standard, as ISO 32000-1:2008. The functionality of a PDF ﬁle
is largely determined by a series of objects such as dictionaries,
arrays, streams and other values (character sets, operators, etc) that
act as metadata to describe the ﬁle. The PDF syntax is best under-
stood by thinking of it in four parts, as described below:
 Objects. A PDF document is a data structure composed from a
small set of basic types of data objects.
 File structure. The PDF ﬁle structure determines how objects are
stored in a PDF ﬁle, how they are accessed, and how they are
updated. This structure is independent of the semantics of the
objects.
 Document structure. The PDF document structure speciﬁes how
the basic object types are used to represent components of a PDF
document: pages, fonts, annotations, and so forth.
 Content streams. A PDF content stream contains a sequence of
instructions describing the appearance of a page or other
graphical entities. These instructions, while also represented as
Fig. 1. OpenPuff cryptographic architecture, from (Oliboni, 2017).
Table 1
Approximate download ﬁgures for OpenPuff as of 27/09/2017.
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objects, are conceptually distinct from the basic objects that
represent the document structure.
It may be handy for understanding later sections of this work to
become more familiar with how streams operate. In (Incorporated,
2006), we ﬁnd that a stream object is a sequence of bytes.
Furthermore, a streammay be of unlimited length, whereas a string
shall be subject to an implementation limit. For this reason, objects
with potentially large amounts of data, such as images and page
descriptions, shall be represented as streams. A stream consists of a
dictionary followed by zero or more bytes bracketed between the
keywords stream (followed by newline) and endstream. The
keyword stream that follows the stream dictionary is followed by
an end-of-line marker consisting of either a CARRIAGE RETURN and
a LINE FEED or just a LINE FEED, and not by a CARRIAGE RETURN
alone. The sequence of bytes that make up a stream lie between the
end-of-line marker following the stream keyword and the end-
stream keyword; the stream dictionary speciﬁes the exact number
of bytes. There should be an end-of-line marker after the data and
before endstream; this marker shall not be included in the stream
length. There shall not be any extra bytes, other than white space,
between endstream and endobj. Fig. 2 provides illustrative exam-
ples of the PDF format.
Both objects and, in particular, streams play an important role in
OpenPuff steganography over PDF ﬁles.
Testing and results
In this section, we present the analytic framework that we
developed to carry out our successful attack against OpenPuff, and
the corresponding results of our analysis. Through our testing
method, we analyse the PDF steganography component of Open-
Puff. From this, we have constructed a distinguisher and a message
estimator (as shown in Appendix 1), to detect the presence of
OpenPuff PDF steganography. These tests are discussed and shown
in Section Testing and results.
Construction of a distinguisher and estimator
OpenPuff claims that data is pre-encrypted with multi-
cryptography before being embedded into a ﬁle. The message is
then scrambled (shufﬂed with random indexes), whitened
(mixed with a high amount of noise, taken from an independent
CSPRNG seeded with hardware entropy) and encoded (with
adaptive non-linear encoding, that takes also original carrier bits
as input). This stego-system also claims ”modiﬁed carriers will
need much less change and deceive many steganalytic tests (e.g.:
chi square test).”
OpenPuff PDF steganography embeds data through the modiﬁ-
cation of end-of-line (EOL) markers, called ’white-space characters'.
In particular, the carriage return (CR) and line feed (LF) characters
Fig. 2. Components (left) and structure (right) of a PDF ﬁle, accessed from (Incorporated, 2006).
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are used to denote newlines in the metadata of a ﬁle. These are
represented by 00A and 0x0D in hex, which we can use as a key
identiﬁer for the detection of OpenPuff PDF steganography. This is
determined by our testing of OpenPuff's embedding impact over
clean PDF ﬁles.
As shown in Fig. 3, the CR and LF characters are ﬂipped once
modiﬁed. Embedding modiﬁcations by OpenPuff will not be
detected through analysis of ﬁle metadata via PDF parsers. Use of
PDF-parser alongside WinMerge revealed identical ﬁles. This em-
phasises that the OpenPuff embedding algorithm requires more
focused analysis.
When the original ﬁle employs exclusively the 00A character,
OpenPuff operates in exactly the opposite fashion. Again, it is the
coexistence of both 0x0D and 00A markers that reveal hidden
contents, because the tool never ﬂips all available values, as it has a
maximum capacity of 50%. Because of this, a method can be con-
structed to perform analysis of PDF ﬁles and extract CR þ LF char-
acters. We have developed a proof of concept for this which is
shown alongside our testing in Section Testing.
In addition to our detection scheme, we constructed an esti-
mator to determine the maximum possible number of bytes that
could be embedded within each ﬁle. The following calculation es-
timates the maximum possible embedded size by using least
squares (Lu et al., 2004).1
maxhiddensize ¼ 0.2204  occurf11 þ 0.2117 
occurf21 þ 0.2115  occurf31-194.6563
2
Table 2 shows a sample of 10 ﬁles with the given maximum
capacity for each PDF ﬁle and our scheme's estimation. Each ﬁle
is from a self-created dataset using our proof-of-concept
(Appendix A).
Testing
To examine the accuracy of the distinguisher, two separate
rounds of testing are performed. The ﬁrst round of testing uses a
small dataset and non-random data embedding. The second
series of tests comprises a signiﬁcantly larger dataset and random
embedded data.
First round of testing
In the ﬁrst round of testing, we obtained a total of 3000 PDF ﬁles.
These were accessed through a webcrawler that traversed three
separate locations. The ﬁrst was a random selection of urls gener-
ated from the DMOZ archive (AOL, 2015). The second dataset of PDF
ﬁles was downloaded from the Archive.org website and the third
set of PDFs were obtained from Google Scholar. These were tested
in three batches of size 1,000 candidate PDFs which were run
through the OpenPuff embedding algorithm and successful carriers
were embedded with a small txt ﬁle that contained a single letter
’a’. This resulted in a total of 50 successful candidate carrier ﬁles
that had information embedded via OpenPuff. In addition to this,
false positive rates for the distinguisher were also tested. Tables 3
and 4 provide an overview of these tests.
The selection of a candidate PDF ﬁle for OpenPuff appears to be a
highly selective process, based on the small number of successfully
modiﬁed ﬁles (approximately 1.6%). Due to the exclusive modiﬁ-
cation of white-space characters, a PDF ﬁle can only be used if the
ﬁle contains enough carrier bytes.
Second round of testing
The second round of testing included a signiﬁcantly larger
dataset. These were downloaded in three separate instances from
Archive.org, using the search phrases ”PDF00, ”Computing”, and
”Medical”. The new datasets comprised a total of 13,000 PDF ﬁles.
From this, 135 were eligible candidates for OpenPuff
steganography.
For each eligible PDF ﬁle, OpenPuff embedded random data at
the maximum capacity offered by the tool. The distinguisher
demonstrated results similar to that shown for the ﬁrst series of
tests with again 100% accuracy for each stego-object analysed (see
Table 5).
False positives produced similar results to those shown on the
ﬁrst series of tests. A false positive rate of 0.5% will ensure that
investigative time spent addressing these ﬂagged objects is mini-
mal (see Table 6).
This method of false positive testing covers a diverse range of
PDF ﬁles. These are from many different creators and sources, and
in some cases do not speciﬁcally follow ofﬁcial standards for the
generation of PDF ﬁles.
Fig. 3. Hex analysis of EOL components modiﬁed by OpenPuff.
Table 2
Estimator results.
File Maximum Capacity (bytes) Estimation (bytes) Error (%)
Test File 1 80 90.64 þ13.3
Test File 2 112 110.74 1.1
Test File 3 64 54.25 15.2
Test File 4 544 545.19 þ0.2
Test File 5 224 218.34 2.5
Test File 6 864 858.92 0.5
Test File 7 80 84.01 þ5.0
Test File 8 1232 1219.72 0.9
Test File 9 80 76.62 4.2
Test File 10 416 412.68 0.7
Table 3
Accuracy results for ﬁrst series of tests.
Datasets Number of ﬁles Processed by OpenPuff (%) Detection Rate
Dataset 1 1000 10 (1.0%) 100%
Dataset 2 1000 13 (1.3%) 100%
Dataset 3 1000 27 (2.7%) 100%
Table 4
False positive results for ﬁrst series of tests.
Number of ﬁles False Positives/Negatives Accuracy
3000 (FP test) 13/1 99.6%
1 The full script can be shown in Appendix A.
2 The full script can be shown in Appendix A.
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Impact of ﬁndings
A total of 16,000 PDF ﬁles were downloaded and examined
using our proposed distinguisher. The results of our tests along-
side other existing attacks in literature reveal an unprecedented
vulnerability in a tool that is surprisingly highly recommended.
This is the second identiﬁed case in which OpenPuff embeds
hidden data through manipulation of metadata components. This
shows that it may work in a similar fashion for other embedding
algorithms for OpenPuff. If other formats can also be attacked
using similar techniques, then any use of the tool would be
inadvisable. There appears to be a signiﬁcant lack of PDF steg-
anography tools, not only in academic literature, but also gener-
ally available to the public. This may result in people hiding
sensitive information with OpenPuff, which as we have shown
can be detected. As a result, it is important to stress that this tool
should not be used in any security setting.
Conclusion
In this paper, we present the ﬁrst attack against the PDF
component of the OpenPuff embedding algorithm. The high ac-
curacy of our distinguisher paired with the simplicity of the
attack raises serious concerns about the tool's security and its
true steganographic capabilities. In light of our results, we believe
that the PDF component of OpenPuff should be considered
completely broken and therefore not ﬁt for purpose. Having
studied the way in which OpenPuff hides data over PDF ﬁles,
many similarities appear with previous results over MP4. This
leads us to believe that other methods of OpenPuff steganog-
raphy will be performed via only the most simplistic metadata
manipulations. As a consequence of this and until further
research is carried out, we strongly discourage the use of the
OpenPuff tool and dispute the author's claim that this tool is
“suitable for highly sensitive data covert transmission”.
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Appendix A. Python Implementation of OpenPuff PDF
Classiﬁer
Table 5
Accuracy results for second series of tests.
Datasets Number of ﬁles Processed by OpenPuff (%) Detection Rate
Dataset 1 5000 56 (1.1%) 100%
Dataset 2 5000 67 (1.3%) 100%
Dataset 3 3000 12 (0.4%) 100%
Table 6
False positive results for second series of tests.
Number of ﬁles False Positives/Negatives Accuracy
13000 (FP test) 68/0 99.5%
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